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ABSTRACT (153 WORDS) 
This article examines how the wishes, feelings, values and beliefs of adults lacking capacity 
can be evaluated and the extent to which they are given effect in best interests’ decision-
making. One way of fulfilling the clinician’s legal responsibilities to take a patient’s 
preferences into account is to explicitly link these to the notion of narrative. Narratives 
provide a compelling grounding and give weight to views and values that may have been 
informally and consistently expressed in the past. An evaluation of recent case law suggests 
that the trajectory of a person’s life, their character and personality, and the perspectives of 
those with whom the patient has valued relationship are given increasing judicial recognition. 
Attending to the narrative of the patient could lead to a more sophisticated judgement of best 
interests than an objective ‘balance sheet’ approach would allow and enable greater 
alignment with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
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PATIENT NARRATIVE: AN ‘ON-SWITCH’ FOR EVALUATING BEST 
INTERESTS  
 
Introduction 
It is accepted that patients should be empowered and actively involved in their care, not 
merely passively receiving authoritative medical pronouncements on their diagnosis and 
treatment (Coulter and Collins 2011).  Patient-centred approaches emphasise the importance 
of understanding patients’ subjective expertise, emotions, history, well-being and lived 
experience as they negotiate the healthcare system. Unsurprisingly references to patients’ 
perspectives tend to be raised in the context of patients who have the capacity to make 
decisions and are able to engage in a meaningful dialogue.    However, the importance of the 
patient’s perspective is increasingly recognised in respect of decisions made for patients who 
are unable to do so themselves (House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005, post legislative scrutiny, 2014, Summary).  The ‘best interests’ decision making 
process, as outlined in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), aims to ensure that the wishes, 
feelings, values and beliefs of patients lacking capacity remain central to the decision being 
made.  In the Supreme Court judgment in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, Lady Hale confirmed that ‘the purpose of the best interests 
test is to consider matters from the patient's point of view’ (para 45). 
 
Compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
requires states to ‘ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the 
rights, will and preferences of the person’ (Article 12(4)). A move away from an ‘objective’ 
assessment of a person’s best interests, requiring greater emphasis on the role of the patient in 
the best interests’ decision making process, achieves a closer alignment with the requirements 
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of the CRPD.  Nevertheless the House of Lords’ post legislative scrutiny of the MCA found 
that best interests’ decision making is often not undertaken in the way set out in the MCA, 
both because health and social care professionals are not aware of the requirements and 
because they find the core principles difficult to apply.  The British Institute of Learning 
Disabilities in their evidence to the Committee reported that ‘all too often “best interests” is 
interpreted in a medical/paternalistic sense which is wholly at odds with that set out in the 
Act’ (para 90).  
 
This paper sets out to consider the following questions: what do the phrases ‘past and present 
wishes and feelings’ ‘beliefs and values’ and ‘other factors’ mean in the context of a clinical 
best interests decision; how can these be ascertained for an individual patient who lacks 
capacity; and to what extent should these be determinative?  We argue that conceptualising 
the patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values in terms of a patient’s narrative could 
provide more in-depth contextual information. It could also give clues as to the best ways to 
enable a meaningful re-focus of best interests’ decision-making, moving from purely clinical 
judgments to the inclusion of values and interests of the patient to more truly reflect the 
principles outlined in the MCA.   
 
Wishes, feelings, beliefs and values  
In England and Wales the ‘best interests’ standard is used for decision making for adults who 
lack capacity. The MCA sets out a checklist of factors that must be considered in deciding 
what is in the best interests of a person who lacks capacity with regard to a particular 
decision. Alongside the medically ascertainable facts and the patient’s clinical needs, the 
decision maker is required to consider, so far as they are ‘reasonably ascertainable’:  
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a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant 
written statement made by him when he had capacity) 
b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, 
and  
c) other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so (s4 (6)).   
 
The MCA Code of Practice gives some guidance as to what these phrases might encompass.  
Wishes and feelings might be revealed by a patient through their ‘emotional responses’ (para 
5.40).  The previously held views of the patient might impact on the decision to be made.  
Evidence of a person’s beliefs and values can be found in their ‘cultural background, 
religious beliefs, political convictions and past behaviors or habits’ (para 5.46).  ‘Other 
factors’ which may be taken into account appear to reflect an acknowledgement of the 
patient’s social world so can include ‘effect of the decision on other people, obligations to 
dependents or the duties of a responsible citizen’ (para 5.47).   In the Matter of G (TJ) [2010] 
EWHC 3005 (COP) Morgan J. stated that the court is not confined to considering the self-
interest of the patient - his wishes which are altruistic and not in any way, directly or 
indirectly self-interested, can be a relevant factor (para 56). So a decision that benefits others 
is permissible but must also be in the best interests of the patient.   
 
The patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values are important constituent elements in 
assessing a patient’s best interests. This is clearly evident in cases such as United 
Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust v N [2014] EWCOP 16 and St George’s Healthcare NHS 
Trust v P [2015] EWCOP 42. However, Hayden J in Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust v TH [2014] EWCOP 4 stated that a patient’s prior wishes are not 
synonymous with their best interests: ‘“wishes” and “best interests” should never be 
conflated, they are entirely separate matters which may ultimately weigh on different sides of 
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the balance sheet’ (para 56). Whilst the assessment of a patient’s best interests involves an 
element of substituted judgment, the patient’s previously expressed wishes are not 
determinative. 
 As Lady Hale stated in Aintree, 
the purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the patient's point of 
view. That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any more than those of a fully 
capable patient must prevail. We cannot always have what we want’ (Aintree 
University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James, Lady Hale, para 45) 
 
Constructing a balance sheet of burdens and benefits which draws on both medical and 
personal information is not straightforward as acknowledged by the Aintree Supreme Court 
judgement:  
 The most that can be said, therefore, is that in considering the best interests of this 
particular patient at this particular time, decision-makers must look at his welfare in 
the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological; they must consider the 
nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of 
success; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely 
to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask 
what his attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult 
others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare, in particular for their 
view of what his attitude would be (para 39, per Lady Hale). 
 
How, though, can health care professionals, whose expertise is in assessing medical best 
interests,  evidence a patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values (as well as other factors) 
when a patient is in a state of incapacity?  Advance decisions and statements provide some 
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sorts of evidence but not everyone states or records their wishes in advance.  Drawing on 
narrative approaches to medicine could provide us with useful insights into how and what to 
try to access.     
 
Drawing on narrative approaches 
The emergence of ‘narrative medicine’ as a tool for clinical practice suggests that the 
emphasis on meaningful communication, understanding and dialogue between clinician and 
patient is an increasingly important competency for healthcare professionals (Greenhalgh & 
Hurwitz 1999). It is based on the assumption that clinicians need to listen to, and seek to 
understand, the stories of their patients with the aim of providing more compassionate, 
humane and appropriate care (Charon 2004).  However, such approaches have been 
concerned exclusively with the possibilities of developing a fruitful collaboration between 
clinician and patient and thus require at least a basic level of current and on-going 
engagement and communication.  To establish the extent to which narrative medicine can 
help to ascertain a patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values when making decisions on 
their behalf when they lack the capacity it is useful to explore the concept further.     
 
Theories of narrative identity are complex and often controversial – which we return to later - 
but here a non-technical definition will suffice: we wish to consider narrative an instantiation 
of the beliefs, values, experiences, actions, decisions, events and relationships that give 
meaning and coherence to a person’s life.  Three particular features of a narrative identity are 
pertinent to our discussion of the potential that narrative has to play in healthcare decision-
making.  
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Firstly, narratives give expression to a person’s deeply held values. Values concern the kind 
of person one is, the sorts of things that are important to one. These can be highly specific, 
for example, adhering to a vegan diet, or more general, for example, a leaning towards 
political liberalism. In some cases, awareness of a patient’s value system clearly prescribes 
how a patient ought to be treated and provides insight into their wishes: it is justifiable for 
clinicians to not provide a blood transfusion to a committed and practising Jehovah’s 
Witness, for example. Other healthcare related values may also dictate the patient’s wishes 
explicitly, for example by being on the organ donor register.  
 
However, not all values guide or direct action so prescriptively. A common value expressed 
by individuals who witness the decline and mental deterioration of elderly relatives is the 
desire for dignity towards the end of life, something that many often do not see as compatible 
with living in a nursing home, being incontinent and requiring assistance with personal care.  
What this reflects is something about the kind of person one is, what one values, and how one 
wishes to live one’s life. Such values may also provide insight into what would give a person 
a good death.  Such expressions do not provide evidence for particular healthcare/end of life 
choices in specific (usually unforeseeable) circumstances, but they do provide a rich seam of 
context in which to make some judgement about what kinds of treatment, or non-treatment, 
the person would likely want in a given situation.  The extent to which these appear coherent 
expressions of value within a person’s life can give them weight and significance. They are 
not individual preferences specific to particular circumstances but general, broad 
instantiations of the kind of person one is and wants to be, with or without capacity.   
 
A second pertinent feature of narratives is that they are not snap-shots or time-slices of a 
person’s psychology at a particular moment in time.  They are not temporally isolated; rather 
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they bind successive events together in a meaningful way, projecting backwards into the past, 
making sense of previous experiences, events and relationships, and they anchor oneself in 
the present.  Furthermore, and importantly for our discussion, they project into the future; for 
example aspiring towards a particular career or getting married with the anticipation of 
starting – or not having - a family, or even planning for one’s death. This temporal nature 
also serves a powerful explanatory function, not only for the purposes of accounting for, or 
explaining, past actions and events, but for making claims about, and giving shape to, the 
future. In representing and explaining the past and present, a narrative may form expectations 
about future events (Teichert 2004, p. 183) and what a person is likely to want or do in the 
future, even if these are not specifically attuned to the particular circumstances that person 
finds  herself in.  Whilst some have argued that a person who lacks capacity may have 
different interests from when they had capacity or, in some circumstances (such as patients 
with dementia) may be viewed as a different person (see for example Dresser, 1995), here we 
are interested in how best to meet to requirements of the Mental Capacity Act in the 
assessment of best interests.     
 
Thirdly, a narrative is not created in isolation from other people: the people with whom one 
has relationships and interactions are crucial in enabling one’s narrative to be fulfilled, 
enacted or otherwise realised. There is much debate about whether or not other people can 
actually constitute a person’s narrative where the person themselves ceases to be able to give 
full expression to it, as in cases of advancing dementia, (Radden and Fordyce 2006, Ch.5) but 
it is not necessary to explore this ontological position here: what matters to the notion of 
narrative is that it is essentially bound up with other people, supported or marginalised by 
those around us. Our significant others can help us give full expression to who we are and 
11 
 
what we want, or undermine it through not hearing, not respecting or dismissing what is 
meaningful and significant to us. 
 
Narrative approaches have been used to understand the patient’s experience of illness and to 
provide insights into this experience in the context of patient’s with capacity.  They have 
been criticised for being too trusting of people’s own accounts of their illness and for 
overemphasising their importance.  Strawson (2004), however, questions the very notion that 
we live our lives like a story – with a beginning and end with a past and a future  – and 
asserts that that there is nothing wrong with living a ‘non-Narrative’ life , being a non-
Narrative person,  where one’s self is not conceived as coherent or existing through time.  
Moreover, Woods (2011) cautions against a narrative approach that, whilst professing to be 
universally applicable, is in fact euro-centric.  She cites the work of Carel (2012) and others 
who explore alternative ways that patients can explore the meaning of their experiences that 
do not require story telling; for example through the use of phenomenology, metaphor or 
photography.    
 
Strawson and Wood’s work are useful reminders to question the notion of a person’s life as a 
continuing story neatly articulated; however, we argue that the three aspects of narrative we 
outline are pertinent, providing insight into understanding what might constitute a patient’s 
wishes, feelings, beliefs and values when they lack capacity.  A review of how recent court 
judgements have drawn on aspects of a patient’s narrative to construct a balance sheet might 
give health care professionals confidence in the role that this can play in making decisions on 
behalf of patients who lack capacity; however, we start with a discussion of a case in which 
these insights did not come into play: Re M.    
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Re M: significant weight to preservation of life 
The case of W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) provides a useful starting point in considering 
the weight attributed to the patient’s prior expressions. M, a previously active and 
independent woman in her 40s was left in minimally conscious state following a sudden 
collapse as a result of contracting viral encephalitis. Despite evidence from the woman’s 
sister and her partner that she would be horrified to be living in such an undignified manner 
(paragraph 119), Baker J. thought it would be wrong to attach significant weight to these 
statements, made before her collapse, because there was no evidence that M ‘ever specifically 
considered the question of withdrawal of ANH [artificial nutrition and hydration], or ever 
considered the question whether she would wish such treatment to be withdrawn if in a 
minimally conscious state’ (paragraph 230). Even if M had considered these issues ‘there is 
no way of knowing her current views, having lived in that state for over eight years’ 
(paragraph 230).  The judge accorded significant weight in the balance sheet to preservation 
of life and declared that withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration was not in M’s best 
interests. Decisions were made as if M were any other person with the constellation of those 
clinical experiences.  Indeed one of the experts called to give evidence to the court, a 
consultant and former neurosurgeon, expressed the view that ANH should never be 
withdrawn from a patient in a minimally conscious state (paragraph 198).  Not surprisingly 
there has been criticism that the judgment in Re M ‘is incompatible with the legal 
requirement to respect the past wishes of incompetent people’ (Mullock 2013 p. 554). 
 
What does this case indicate about the possible use of the notion of narrative to support best 
interests’ decision-making? The three aspects of narrative sketched above can be illustrative 
here: firstly, M’s prior expressions were deemed not sufficiently specified to carry evidential 
weight in the judgement. Where there is no written advance refusal of treatment or advance 
13 
 
care plan the patient’s prior views are inevitably piecemeal. However, in the absence of 
experience or anticipation of illness, M nevertheless had indicated her views about dignity, 
dependence and what she felt was an acceptable quality of life. Thinking more broadly about 
a patient’s narrative can combat the assumption that written, recorded, witnessed statements 
of explicit preference under a particular set of circumstances are required in order to know 
anything at all about what the patient would likely want.    
 
Secondly, the kind of person M was prior to her accident did, intuitively for her family and 
loved ones, count for something in considering what she might want in these unforeseen 
circumstances. The kind of person she was and who she wanted to be mattered deeply to their 
consideration of what they thought would be in her best interests, and what she would have 
wanted given her current predicament. The idea of narrative as projecting into the future 
resonates here, although as Strawson (2004) reminds us, the idea of narrative as linear is 
limiting.  The experience of illness, pain and dying can jolt on-going narrative identity, and 
values may change in light of new circumstances; this should make us cautious not to imply 
that the indications of a prior narrative ought in any way to trump other considerations. 
However, as an evidentiary background outlining why a person’s past wishes and feelings 
bear relevance to the current decision at hand, the notion of narrative encapsulates what is 
epistemically important: that who a person was is meaningful and significant in 
understanding who they are now and deciding how they should be treated.   
 
Finally, M’s family provided a coherent, consistent picture of M’s life, her values and broad 
wishes that were relevant to the situation she was now in. It is often difficult in practice to say 
what a patient would have wanted in the circumstances in which they now find themselves, 
because, as previously outlined, it is unlikely that they would ever have specifically 
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articulated their wishes and preferences for those precise circumstances. As Kuczewski points 
out ‘it is likely that many people are not the kind of persons who will know far in advance 
exactly what he/she will want in new and strange situations’ (Kuczewski, 1999, p. 34).  
Indeed this is one of the difficulties of writing advance decisions where the bar for validity 
requires a high level of specificity.  Nevertheless, expressions of a persons’ narrative may be 
evidenced through the testimony of friends and family, drawing on things the patient 
previously said or did, and any current wishes those who are close to the patient are able to 
interpret as small indications of basic preferences.  
 
Increasing judicial account of narrative in best interests’ decision making 
Whilst in Re M the judge indicated the need for a high level of specificity of prior views and 
beliefs in assessing her best interests, subsequent cases have indicated an increasing 
recognition by the judiciary that a patient’s wider life story plays a valuable constitutive 
element in best interests’ decision making.  Patient narrative has been accepted as relevant 
when expressed in a wide variety of contexts, including: broad verbal statements which might 
have relevance to the current situation the patient finds herself in; evidence of character, 
indicating the patient’s attitude to how they would wish to be treated; and wider 
interpretations of the sort of person the patient was and how they would thus likely respond to 
current treatments.   
 
Judges have taken into account evidence from family and friends about the private nature of 
the patient and therefore the distress of being subject to ongoing treatment. In Re D [2012] 
EWHC 885 (COP) the judge focussed on what the patient was like, his characteristics and the 
way he lived his life previously, in order to gain a broader understanding about what 
treatment option would now be in his best interests. Peter Jackson J. acknowledged that ‘D 
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was a very private man before his incapacity’ and drew the conclusions from the nature of the 
person D was, as articulated by his family: that he ‘would have been horrified at the prospect 
of being kept alive in this condition with the total loss of privacy that his dependency entails’ 
(paragraph 17).  
 
In the case of Aintree v James the relevance of the history of the patient and the type of 
characteristics he had displayed before loss of capacity was considered throughout the court 
hierarchy. In the High Court, Peter Jackson J. referred to the sentiment of DJ’s wife (MJ) that 
the manner in which he had fought cancer 10 years previously gave an indication of the way 
he would now wish to receive treatment to keep him alive. MJ felt that DJ's experience of 
cancer threw light on his values and wishes in the current situation. It had been a very rough 
time, but he had told her ‘this will not beat me’. The family believed that he would have the 
same attitude in his current predicament (NHS Trust v DJ [2012] EWHC 3524 (COP) 
paragraph 67). 
 
Aintree v James marks a high watermark in the importance of the patient’s wishes, feelings 
values and beliefs informing best interests. In the Court of Appeal, Laws L.J., referred 
specifically to ‘bios’ - life as lived, and Dworkin’s concept of the “actions, decisions, motives 
and events that compose what we now call a biography” (Aintree NHS Trust v David James 
[2013] EWCA Civ 65 paragraph 48). Laws L.J. (quoting Smith 2012 p. 319) noted that the 
ways in which we use our lives provide additional value to our mere existence and the 
biographical aspects of our lives have value and meaning and can be as important as, and 
sometimes even more important than, the fact of our existence. In the Supreme Court Lady 
Hale argued that the patient’s ascertainable wishes, feelings, beliefs and values and the things 
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which are important to him, should be taken into account because ‘they are a component in 
making the choice which is right for him as an individual human being’(paragraph 45). 
 
Subsequently, a number of cases indicate increasing judicial recognition of, and reliance on, 
evidence of the broad characteristics of the patient prior to loss of capacity in assessing his 
best interests. In United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust v N [2014] EWCOP 16, Pauffley 
J. took account of the type of person N (a woman in her fifties in minimally conscious state) 
was, through testimony of her former husband, adult daughter and cousin (C), in determining 
N’s best interests. The judge considered it relevant that N had always been a very private 
person and that she had never enjoyed being touched and so C thought that ‘the necessity of 
having everything done for her, as now, must be intolerable for N’ (paragraph 32). In 
Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v TH [2014] EWCOP 4  TH, a man in 
his fifties in minimally conscious state, fed through naso-gastric tube, was described by 
friends and a former wife and long term partner as a very private, non-tactile person. Thus he 
would find ‘abhorrent’ the thought of being dependent on other people to clean and feed him. 
His friends said the fact that TH had a dislike of authority which extended to hospitals and 
‘medics of any description however well meaning’ (para 41) would mean that his present 
situation would be pure torture for him. Whilst lacking the specificity that Baker J required of 
the patient’s wishes in W v M, in Sheffield Hayden J said that TH has ‘in so many oblique and 
tangential ways over so many years communicated his views so uncompromisingly, and 
indeed bluntly, that none of his friends are left in any doubt what he would want in his 
present situation’ (para 53).  The judge noted that the court had heard ‘a holistic account of a 
man’s character, life, talents and priorities’ and that ‘privacy, personal autonomy and dignity 
have not only been features of TH’s life, they have been the creed by which he has lived it’ 
(para 53, our italics). As such, it was in his best interests to go home and end his life quietly 
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and with dignity. The judge reiterated the importance of Baroness Hale’s judgment in Aintree 
in placing emphasis on a ‘holistic’ evaluation when assessing both ‘wishes and feelings’ and 
‘best interests’, rather than focussing on individual sentences or remarks. 
 
The religious views and practices of the patient are important evidence of the patient’s 
narrative up to the point of incapacity and judges have attached significance to a patient’s 
religious views in determining current best interests.  In NHS Trust v L [2013] EWHC 4313 
(Fam), one of the factors in the balance sheet pointing towards the provision of active 
resuscitation was listed as the ‘dignity in prolonging life, promoting personal autonomy and 
respecting an individual's religious principles’ (para 121). Similarly in St George’s NHS 
Foundation Trust v P [2015] EWCOP 42, evidence from a cousin that the patient was a 
deeply religious man, who strongly believed that life was sacred, given by God and only 
taken away by God, was acknowledged in the balance sheet. In Newcastle upon Tyne NHS 
Foundation Trust v LM [2014] EWHC 454 (COP), Peter Jackson J went as far as stating that 
the wishes and feelings and long-standing beliefs and values of the patient in respect of blood 
transfusions, congruent with her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness and evidenced in letters from 
members of her congregation, carried “determinative weight”. 
 
More recently, in M v N, Bury Clinical Commissioning Group [2015] EWCOP 76 (Re N) 
Hayden J considered a broad canvass of evidence to inform his decision whether it was in the 
patient’s best interests to continue to receive artificial nutrition and hydration by way of the 
PEG tube. He observed that, 
 
an assessment of P's wishes, views and attitudes are not to be confined within the 
narrow parameters of what P may have said.  Strong feelings are often expressed non-
18 
 
verbally, sometimes in contradistinction to what is actually said. Evaluating the wider 
canvass may involve deriving an understanding of P's views from what he may have 
done in the past in circumstances which may cast light on the strength of his views on 
the contemplated treatment. 
 
Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60, affirmed the importance of adopting a 
‘holistic’ approach on a case-by-case basis.  Mr B at 73 years needed surgery for a leg 
amputation which the Trust believed was in his best interests (or he would die in a very short 
space of time); with surgery he might survive another few years.  He had lived with a mental 
illness for many years, one of the symptoms of which was ‘angelic voices’; he was refusing 
the surgery and was assessed as lacking the capacity to make the decision.  Peter Jackson J 
stated that the weight given to wishes and feelings, beliefs and values of a person lacking 
capacity varies depending on the case but that religiously-based wishes and feelings such as 
B’s should not be disregarded because they were long standing and integral to his life.  B 
made statements consistent with his refusal: he believed that the amputation would be against 
God’s will.  The judge concluded: ‘I am quite sure that it would not be in Mr B’s best 
interests to take away his little remaining independence and dignity to replace it with a future 
which he understandably has no appetite and which could only be achieved after a traumatic 
and uncertain struggle that he and no-one else would have to endure’ (para 45).    
 
Section 4 of the MCA requires that the person making a determination about best interests 
must consider all the ‘relevant circumstances’ (ss2) of which he is aware and which are 
reasonable to regard as relevant (ss11). What we can see from recent court decisions is that 
the way a person has lived their life – what we could describe as their narrative up and 
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beyond (as in Wye Valley) the point of incapacity - seems increasingly to have legal relevance 
in the determination of current best interests.  
 
Evidencing narrative and the weight attributed to it 
Narrative may be a useful way of seeing the different elements of relatives’ and carers’ 
testimony and past expressions of wishes, feelings, beliefs and values of a patient, drawing 
them together into a more compelling testimony that can have evidential weight in the 
process of best interests decision-making. It might thus provide a grounding and give weight 
to wishes and feelings that may have been informally but consistently expressed in the past. 
In Re N (2015) the Official Solicitor propounded that the strong element of substituted 
judgment in best interests’ assessment is achieved through evidence from relatives about the 
patient’s wishes and feelings which may assist the decision maker to understand the patient. 
But to what extent can narrative be evidenced and what weight is and should be attributed to 
it? 
 
The difficulty of extrapolating current best interests from prior experiences and expressions 
was recognised in Re N.  Hayden J questioned how the family’s evidence of the patient’s 
‘feistiness’ translated into what she would want now (para 59) but ultimately, regarded the 
clear and compelling impression of Mrs N, derived from evidence of her family as ‘part of a 
picture which helps me to understand Mrs. N's moral imperatives and the code by which she 
lived her life’ (para 59). N’s family were able to give the patient a ‘clear voice’ in the 
courtroom, but how much more compelling and cogent were their views than those of the 
family of M, where Baker J did not give them substantial weight? 
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In Re M the patient’s sister recounted that on visiting their grandmother in a nursing home M 
had said that, if she was in danger of going into residential home, she would rather shorten 
her life by ten years than have someone look after her (para 107). In Re N the daughter gave 
evidence that N hated seeing her parents in a diminished state living in a care home and 
recalled her mother saying "if I ever get like that shoot me!” (para 55). Evidence that the 
patients would not want to be a burden was also similar.  M’s sister recounted that M was 
fiercely independent and would have hated to be looked after.  Hayden J in Re N went as far 
as stating that ‘the importance of the wishes and feelings of an incapacitated adult, 
communicated to the court via family or friends but with similar cogency and authenticity, 
are to be afforded no less significance than those of the capacitous’ (para32) and that where 
the wishes views and feelings of the patient can be ascertained with ‘reasonable confidence’, 
they are always to be afforded great respect.  
 
How much weight should be attributed to factors such as ‘independence’, ‘feistiness’, 
‘courage’, ‘determination’, and a ‘dislike of intrusion into personal space’ when assessing 
current best interests of the patient which may result in withdrawal of life sustaining 
treatment?  The answer is likely to be that it depends on the context and the holistic 
assessment of a patient’s narrative.  When referring to wishes and feelings, in ITW v Z and 
others [2009] EWHC 2525 (Fam) Munby J concluded:  
 
…one cannot as it were attribute any particular a priori weight or importance to P’s 
wishes and feelings…and even if one is dealing with a particular individual, the 
weight to be attached to their wishes and feelings must depend upon the particular 
context (para 35).   
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However, in light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), merely taking account of the patient’s previously expressed wishes and 
her known beliefs and values would not go far enough. In contrast to competent adult 
decision making, where autonomous decisions are accorded respect, a person who lacks 
capacity (to make healthcare decisions) has decisions made for her, by the consultant in 
charge of her care, or the courts. Article 12 (4) requires States parties to adopt safeguards 
ensuring measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity that respect the rights, will and 
preferences of the person and the UN Disability Committee has interpreted this as indicating 
that ‘national laws should provide support to disabled people to ensure that their will and 
preferences are respected, rather than overruled by action which is considered to be in the 
person’s objective best interests’ (Committee on the Rights of Person with Disabilities, 2014, 
paras 20 and 21). 
 
As part of the post legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 evidence was given 
to the House of Lords Select Committee that placing greater emphasis on the role of the 
patient in the best interests decision making process both simultaneously diminishes the 
importance of objective criteria and achieves a closer alignment with the requirements of the 
CRPD, as the will, rights and preferences of the patient should be ‘the starting point for any 
kind of determination of what is best for an individual’ (paragraph 99).  Bartlett goes further 
and suggests that ‘if the ethos of Article 12 is to be implemented it would seem that a 
legislative amendment will be required in this respect’ (Bartlett, 2012, p. 766). The Essex 
Autonomy Project position paper, Achieving CRPD Compliance (2014), recommends that; 
 
The best-interests decision-making framework on which the MCA relies should be 
amended to establish a rebuttable presumption that, when a decision must be made on 
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behalf of a person lacking in mental capacity, and the wishes of that person can be 
reasonably ascertained, the best-interests decision-maker shall make the decision that 
accords with those wishes. 
 
In the consultation paper Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty, (No. 222, 2015) the 
Law Commission was concerned that ‘that the law currently fails to give sufficient certainty 
for best interests’ decision-makers on how much emphasis should be given to the person’s 
wishes and feelings’ (para 12.42). It provisionally proposed that section 4 of the Mental 
Capacity Act should be amended so that there is an assumption that the person’s wishes and 
feelings are ‘determinative’ as to their best interests, although the Commission noted that this 
assumption could be overridden where there are ‘good reasons’ to do so. Peter Jackson J in 
Wye Valley NHS Trust v B (2015) commented that rather than leading to greater certainty 
such change would give rise to debate about whether there was or was not ‘good reason’ for 
a departure from the assumption and he considered that ‘all that is needed to protect the rights 
of the individual is to properly apply the Act as it stands’ (para 17). 
 
However, the House of Lords Select Committee post legislative scrutiny of the Mental 
Capacity Act (2014) found that in many cases the statutory provisions for determining best 
interests, especially those concerning the wishes and beliefs of the patient, and consultation 
with family and carers, were ‘not well known or used’ (para 91).   
 
Implications for clinical practice  
In clinical practice healthcare professionals are tasked with providing ‘objective’ reasons for 
their determination of a person’s best interests; they must be able to demonstrate them and 
show that they have considered all relevant circumstances and applied all elements of the best 
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interests’ checklist (MCA Code of Practice para 5.61).  How healthcare professionals 
currently incorporate patients’ wishes, feelings, values and beliefs in best interests’ 
assessments requires more empirical research; undertaking this task may be straightforward 
in many instances, but fraught with problems in others.   
 
Valid advance decisions provide health care professionals with some type of objective 
evidence of what the patient wishes and advance statements can provide more contextual 
information directly from that patient.  Appointing a Lasting Power of Attorney can now 
formally recognise a patient’s choice of decision maker in the best interests’ assessment.  
However, currently only a minority of people use these legal means of expressing their 
wishes when they lack capacity.  A recent survey (Dying Matters 2014 
http://www.comres.co.uk/poll/1173/ncpc-dying-matters-survey.htm) reported that only 6% of 
British adults have written down their wishes/preferences for future care when they lack 
capacity and only 21%  say that they have discussed their end of life wishes with somebody.   
 
Given this, it is hardly surprising that best interests are often interpreted in a narrow – clinical 
– sense; healthcare professionals’ expertise is in this area and they are likely to feel more 
assured in their decision-making in this respect, particularly when the stakes are high.  The 
rhetoric around evidence-based (objective) medicine sits more comfortably in the context of 
assessing the clinical harms and benefits associated with particular treatments or procedures.  
This is something they can know and provide evidence for rather than something they might 
consider to be subjective or unreliable.  Moreover subjective assessments might lead to more 
disagreement amongst healthcare professionals: in Wye, Dr Glover, a psychiatrist, stated that 
a body of his peers would probably splinter widely in their views on best interests of the 
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patient and so would feel 'more comfortable morally’ in opting to support the continuation of 
life. 
 
Drawing on the accounts of those concerned with the welfare of the patient presents 
additional problems.  Ho acknowledges that family and clinicians may appear to speak 
different languages when considering what is best for their loved one/patient and that there 
persists a credibility gap between the value attributed to medical ‘facts’ and family’s ‘views’ 
in advocating for what they believe the person would have wanted (Ho 2009 p. 498). She 
argues that, especially when family members disagree with clinical recommendations, they 
can be labelled as too emotional to see the picture objectively: perhaps ‘not getting it’ or are 
‘in denial’ or are suspected of having ulterior motives in advocating care options that appear 
counter to the patient’s clinical best interests.  
 
We are not advocating that clinical best interests be relegated in some way.  Though an 
important part of best interests’ decision making, the patient’s views, wishes, beliefs and 
prior statements should not be seen as determinative either.  Further, we should be cautious 
about the extent that family and friends really ‘know’ what the patient would have wanted or 
would want (see for example Shalowitz et al).   Overreliance on the family’s evidence of 
what the patient would have wanted in the current situation may also serve to marginalise 
health care professionals’ view of the clinical benefits and burdens of treatment. For example, 
in NHS Trust v L [2013] EWHC 4313 (Fam) the patient’s wife said that her husband had been 
a deeply religious man who had spoken of desiring a ‘good death in line with his faith’. The 
family confidently believed that if Mr L could express himself, he would want to be given all 
possible treatment which would or might prolong his life. The view of the healthcare 
professionals in contrast was that ‘unnaturally prolonging Mr L's life by invasive ventilation 
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or resuscitation would seem cruel’ (para 25). The judge recognised that the family's views 
and their assessment of Mr L's likely views should not be substituted for the balancing 
exercise required by the Mental Capacity Act.  
 
How then can healthcare professionals integrate a patient’s narrative into the best interest 
assessment in a meaningful way?  Dementia UK have advocated the use of Life Story Work  
whereby a person’s life is collated into a Life Story Book to help health and social care 
professionals understand more about that person.  The books represent the person’s past and 
present narrative and can provide useful evidence for best interest assessments alongside the 
context for daily care. (https://www.dementiauk.org/for-healthcare-professionals/free-
resources/life-story-work/). The King’s Psychosocial Assessment and Communication 
Evaluation (K-PACE) (Higginson et al 2013) was developed to support psychosocial aspects 
of care of very ill patients on intensive care units, aiming to establish an early assessment of 
the patient and family circumstances beyond medical diagnosis. It includes a checklist for 
information about the patient’s spiritual/religious beliefs and whether the patient had 
expressed any preferences for treatment/care. Greater emphasis on supporting the relatives of 
very sick patients and the patient’s individual needs has resulted in beneficial outcomes. This 
type of tool, whilst not aimed at determining all the information that might illuminate who the 
patient is, serves to underscore and remind clinicians of the importance of a paying attention 
to wider aspects of ill patients and their families - to ‘do right’ by the patient. 
 
Both these initiatives set out to understand who the patient was and is.  Family members may 
elucidate whether the treatment option proposed fits with the patient’s views in general and 
who she is, or, as Blustein puts it “how well a particular decision hangs together with 
elements of the formerly competent patient’s identity-constituting narrative” (Blustein 1999 
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p. 23). This is not to suggest that a prior narrative ought to have prescriptive force, overruling 
any contemporary expressions of wishes or preferences - if these can be given - or to set a 
person’s future path in stone. Rather, a patient’s narrative provides a backdrop or context 
within which healthcare decisions can be made, providing a rationale for making sense of 
what a person might have wanted in the situation. It is part of the totality of the whole 
evidence base available to clinicians allowing them to gain a more substantial insight into the 
person’s character in a way that isolated instances of expressions of values and wishes do not. 
Individually, these expressions may not amount to much, but attending to narrative provides 
an evidence base that is greater than the sum of its parts, and accords the patient’s life dignity 
and respect. 
 
Conclusion   
Peter Jackson J stated in Wye that ‘a conclusion that a person lacks decision-making capacity 
is not an “off-switch” for his rights and freedoms… It is I think, important to ensure that 
people are not - by the very fact of their disability - deprived of the range of reasonable 
outcomes that are available to others’ (paras 11,12).  We have argued that the legal obligation 
of the decision-maker in determining the best interests of a patient who lacks capacity could 
be helpfully construed using the concept of a patient ‘narrative’, which purposefully draws 
together atomistic pieces of evidence and testimony into a more coherent picture of a patient.  
Regard to patient narrative is congruent with an ethical obligation to respect the dignity of the 
patient and is consistent with patient-centeredness.  However, we wish to make a stronger 
claim that attending to patient narrative is a useful heuristic for clinicians. Rather than 
considering the teasing out of narrative as an additional burden, adding complexity to clinical 
practice, this can be viewed as supportive of, and integral to, decision-making, providing 
meaningful evidence of best interests for the clinician. Narrative is one type of evidence and, 
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whilst it may not be overwhelming or prescriptive, is has a valuable part to play in best 
interests’ assessments. 
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